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I. GDPR and the awakening of  the sleeping princess: the 
question of  data ownership 
On May 25, 2018, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)1 became 
applicable – and since then, our email box has been filled with requests for consent 
to continue to receive newsletters and similar information. After all, the European 
citizen found himself/herself  “owner” of  his/her data on the Internet (which until 
now was doubtful, we hope it is no longer ...) and can no longer be pestered by 
undesirable emails. He/She realised that personal data is not only that which enables 
one to ascertain the identification of  a person, but also that data which allows one 
reach this identification by association of  concepts and contents, even if  a direct 
reference to its holder is not made – as would be the case with the Internet Protocol 
(IP) address through which one accesses the Web or the registration of  a vehicle. It 
was as if  the European citizen, like the sleeping princess in the children’s tale, had 
awakened from a deep sleep to discover that the value of  the retribution he/she 
received, as well as the sound of  his/her recorded voice to allow access to a bank 
account, or the registration of  the purchases you make and the means of  payment 
you use, but also your medical history, your debts and credits, your resume, etc. are all 
personal data, since being associated with a natural person, they allow you to identify 
it. Moreover, the European citizen has realised that such data is protected by EU law 
when subjected to an operation/treatment carried out with or without the use of  
automated means. 
Still somewhat amazed, the European citizen now seeks to know why his/
her data is so appealing (they had no idea!). That is, he/she seeks to understand 
the reason for the noise around rules that regulate not only the treatment of  your 
personal data but also (soon) your privacy in the electronic communications area.2 
What is relevant in computerized personal data? To the point that the Court of  
Justice of  the European Union (CJEU), since the judgment in Lindqvist - followed by 
Scarlet, Digital Rights, Google, Shrems, Tele 23, etc. – has fought a real battle, sometimes 
misunderstood, for the European legislator to adopt the GDPR. The reason is simple: 
the free movement of  data is indispensable for the development of  the so-called 
digital economy. Technological solutions that allow the smarter use of  resources such 
as energy and water, the reduction of  pesticides in agriculture, the competitiveness 
of  manufacturing, as well as the reduction of  road accidents, all depend on data 
processing.4 The learning algorithms of  Google, Facebook, Amazon, Apple, etc., 
learn from the data we give them. That is why it is said that data (including personal 
1 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  27 April 2016.
2 Proposal for a Regulation of  the European Parliament and of  the Council concerning the 
respect for private life and the protection of  personal data in electronic communications and 
repealing Directive 2002/58/EC (Regulation on Privacy and Electronic Communications), 
COM(2017) 10 final, 10 Jan. 2017, available on http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/
HTML/?uri=CELEX:52017PC0010&from=EN.
3 Judgment Lindqvist, 6 Nov. 2003, case C-101/01, ECLI:EU:C:2003:596; Judgment Scarlet, 24 Nov. 
2011, case C-70/10, ECLI:EU:C:2011:771; Judgment Digital Rights Ireland, 8 April 2014, joint cases 
C-293/12 and C-594/12, ECLI:EU:C:2014:238; Judgment Google, 13 May 2014, case C-131/12, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:317; Judgment Schrems, 6 Oct. 2015, case C- 362/14, ECLI:EU:C:2015:650; 
Judgment Tele 2, 21 Dec. 2016, joint cases C-203/15 and C-698/15, ECLI:EU:C:2016:970.
4 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of  the Regions on the mid-term review on 
the implementation of  the Digital Single Market Strategy A Connected Digital Single Market for All 
[COM(2017) 228 final], Brussels, 10 May 2017, available on http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/
EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52017DC0228&from=PT.
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data) are at the basis of  the algorithmic revolution that is changing the world.
But private life is not (it should not be) a marketable product (especially against 
the will of  the interested ones). We know that the privacy breach that increasingly 
accompanies the universal use of  the Internet ensures the monitoring of  every 
human gesture and idea. There is even vigilance for sale, by high profits, by the 
hand of  a series of  technological companies.5 There must definitely be limits, since 
respect for privacy and protection of  personal data is a prerequisite for stable, secure 
and competitive global trade flows.6 That is why there is a need for a set of  rules 
governing, in particular, liability, transparency and accountability in the digital age 
- and to translate the intrinsically European and humanistic universal values that 
characterize Europe’s contribution to society. Norms that do not jeopardize the 
process of  research, innovation, and the development of  digitalisation7, but shape the 
technological revolution so that the advantages of  robotics and learning algorithms 
are widely shared, avoiding as much as possible their potential dangers.
Of  course, we cannot go back to the pastoral age, especially since society is 
reorienting its interests, from a specific connectivity (computers, smart phones, etc.) 
to ubiquitous connectivity (articles for domestic use, industrial products, etc.). It is 
estimated that by 2020 about 6 billion household devices (televisions, refrigerators, 
washing machines, etc.) will be connected to the Internet in the European Union.8 
This poses a significant threat to privacy, due to the positioning of  connected devices 
in traditionally protected and intimate spaces, with the ability to extract and transmit 
information about sensitive personal data.9 An intensely connected market and 
society is more vulnerable to cyberattacks – which harms businesses of  all sizes and 
compromises confidence in the digital economy and democratic institutions.
In any case, the premise to face it must always be the one where nothing is 
inevitable concerning the impact of  digital technologies. Everything depends to a 
large extent on how citizens, businesses and public authorities decide to use them 
and how their regulatory framework is defined.10 Moreover, as revealed by the General 
Report presented under the FIDE Congress 201811, the biggest problem of  digital 
is perhaps the risk of  overregulation in a highly variable and unpredictable sector. 
In the opinion of  the European Data Protection Supervisor on the proposal for 
a Regulation on privacy and electronic communications (e-privacy Regulation), the 
complexity of  the rules is criticized – which creates a potentially involuntary risk of  
protection gaps.12 
5 António Damásio, A estranha ordem das coisas – a vida, os sentimentos e as culturas humanas, Círculo de 
Leitores, 2017, Lisboa (The strange order of  thimgs – life, feeling and the making of  cultures).
6 Communication from the Commission on the mid-term review on the implementation of  the Digital Single Market 
Strategy...
7 Digitisation is conceived here as “the way in which many domains of  social life are restructured around 
digital communication and media infrastructures or the way in which these media structure, shape, and influence the 
contemporary world”, see Corien Prins et al. (ed.), Digital democracy in a globalized world (UK/USA: Edward 
Elgar Publishing, 2017), 6.
8 Communication from the Commission on the mid-term review on the implementation of  the Digital Single Market 
Strategy...
9 Resolution of  the European Parliament with recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law 
Rules on Robotics, 2015/2103(INL), 16 Feb. 2017, available on http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A8-2017-0005+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN.
10 Communication from the Commission on the mid-term review on the implementation of  the Digital Single Market 
Strategy...
11 General Report - XXVIII FIDE Congress - Vol. I (The internal market and the digital economy), ed. 
José Luís da Cruz Vilaça et al (Lisboa: Almedina, 2018).
12 Opinion of  the European Data Protection Supervisor on the Proposal for a Regulation on 
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In this text, we will try to demonstrate why the protection of  personal data has 
become the fundamental identity issue of  our times. The protection of  personal data 
acquired legal-constitutional centrality not only because the Digital Single Market13 
has become a primary public interest to pursue – and the desired movement of  
people, goods, services, and capital implies an increase in the cross-border flow 
of  data. Nor has it been only because the finalization of  the Digital Single Market 
requires a stable legal environment that stimulates innovation, combats market 
fragmentation, and allows competitiveness on fair and balanced terms. This legal-
constitutional role is also not just a matter of  the certainly impressive estimate that 
the value of  the data economy will rise to EUR 739 billion by 2020, corresponding 
to 4% of  total EU GDP (i.e. more than twice the current value) and the number of  
professionals in the data sector will increase from 6 million in 2016 to more than 10 
million by 2020.14 Then why?
Well, the protection of  personal data has become the fundamental identity issue 
of  our times so that the project of  humanism does not become irrelevant.
II. The Internal Market and the teleology of  fundamental 
rights: the issue of  citizenship
Homo digitalis15 is increasingly more present in all of  us. It surrounds us, it 
captures us. Our daily life is digitalising rapidly. It imposes on us a reorganization of  
the habitual pattern of  life – or the digitisation of  our life processes. We live, factually 
and considerably, a virtual existence…but very real! The real and the virtual merge in 
our normal life, the frontiers between these dimensions of  our existence are blurring. 
Yet, this high-tech life of  ours does not seem to be easily framed by law. Law has its 
own time – for now barely compatible with the speed of  technologic developments. 
It is a time-deferred time – not a real time. Besides, in the face of  new realities, it 
naturally hesitates in the pursuit of  the value path (therefore, normative) to follow. 
We must give (its) time to law, without disregarding the obstacles and challenges of  
homo digitalis.
That is why, in the context of  European integration, the importance of  an 
effective uniform regime for the protection of  personal data – able to debate 
technological advances and, at the same time, concretizing the fundamental right 
enshrined, directly and autonomously, in Article 8 of  the Charter of  Fundamental 
Rights of  the European Union (CFREU) – must be observed and understood in 
the light of  the meaning and objectives which have, in the recent past, been directed 
towards deepening integration.
As the goal of  building a solid Internal Market was achieved, the “engine” 
of  deepening integration began to gradually focus on building effective European 
citizenship. In a way, the Union, this kind of  ‘unidentified political object’, according to 
the expression of  Jacques Delors, no longer has prejudices regarding the assumption 
Privacy and Electronic Communications (ePrivacy Regulation), Official Journal of  the European 
Union (2017/C 234/03), available on http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/
HTML/?uri=CELEX:52017XX0720(01)&from=PT.
13 A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe [COM (2015) 192].
14 Communication from the Commission on the mid-term review on the implementation of  the Digital Single Market 
Strategy...
15 The expression is used regularly as a synonym for literacy/knowledge and dependence on the new 
information and communication technologies (ICT) that have invaded our daily lives. See Natasha 
Saxberg, Homo digitalis: How the human needs support digital behavior for people, organizations and societies (Co-
penhagen: Dansk Psykologisk Forlag, 2015).
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of  its nature and its political yardstick (political Union). To a certain extent, the 
priority focus of  the institutions is no longer the construction of  the Internal Market 
(basically achieved), to concentrate on the citizen, regardless of  his or her quality or 
“clothing” as an economic or consumer agent.
Freedom of  movement was affirmed and guaranteed, initially through the case 
law of  the CJEU, as a freedom of  personal movement, irrespective of  or in addition to 
freedom of  movement. Social intervention, inherent in the affirmation of  European 
citizenship (being still and above all a “citizenship of  rights”), has become one of  the 
concerns of  the action of  the Institutions. A certain return to some ordoliberal views 
was reaffirmed to mitigate the hardship of  a construction focused solely on the market 
and economic competition: with the Lisbon reform, the Treaty on the European 
Union (TEU) expressly associates the Internal Market with a “highly competitive social 
market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress” – Article 3(3) TEU. We want, 
with this note, to affirm that today and in the context of  the EU’s affirmation as a 
Union based on the rule of  law, the importance and attention given to the effectiveness 
of  this fundamental right to the protection of  personal data, is not justified only by the 
pressure of  the technological times that we live in and by the progressive emergence 
of  a homo digitalis. Upstream, the increasingly (more or less) political sense of  deepening 
integration, the priority placed on the construction of  European citizenship [Articles 
20 and 21 of  the Treaty on the Functioning of  the European Union (TFEU)] and 
the reinforcement of  an extra-economic integration dimension have favoured the 
development of  a European culture of  fundamental rights.
Unequivocally, the Internal Market and the application of  economic freedoms 
initially served as a pretext for the jurisprudential construction of  a dogmatic and 
European personalist culture of  Fundamental Rights; but nowadays, more and more, 
the strengthening and deepening of  the Internal Market (of  economic integration) 
develop themselves according to a teleology of  protection of  fundamental rights, 
inseparable from the densification of  European citizenship. We can reasonably say 
that the referential paradigm of  the Internal Market is, nowadays, a market where, 
firstly, citizens are moving and circulating who are also, circumstantially, economic 
agents and consumers.
At the stage where the immediate objective of  the European institutions’ action 
was the realization and/or deepening, in certain areas of  activity, of  the Internal 
Market, it was essential to guarantee the free circulation of  personal information. 
Increased cross-border movement of  people, goods, capital, and the provision of  
services has led to an increase in the collection and circulation of  personal data - and 
this increase in the flow of  (and economic use) of  data has made it necessary to 
establish, in the European area, an equivalent level of  protection in all Member States. 
That is, the protection of  data arose from the need to circulate personal information 
in the Internal Market in a secure condition for the data owners. This equivalent 
level of  protection should result, as a minimum, from harmonized legislation. It is 
in this context that Directive 95/46/EC arises (i) imposing on Member States the 
obligation to adopt domestic legislation offering similar safeguards throughout the 
European area, and (ii) stipulating procedures and behaviour in relation to the flow 
of  personal data to be transferred to third countries (which were classified by the 
European Commission in a differentiated way, depending on whether or not they 
offered an “adequate level of  protection” with regard to personal data). 
However, this phase of  regulatory harmonization has proved to be inadequate 
in the face of  the astonishing circulation of  computerized data, with the introduction 
of  a uniform application system in the Union, with a view to giving back control 
of  personal data to its holders. Since January 2012, the Union institutions have 
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announced the need to undertake a revision/reform of  the data protection legal 
regime then in force. The fragmentation of  national systems resulting from the 
various transpositions of  Directive 95/46 was one of  the reasons for the need for 
reform, technically and from the point of  view of  legal certainty and uniformity. 
Therefore, it was always clear that the intention was to move forward with a Regulation 
(henceforth standardizing) repealing and replacing Directive 95/46. Moreover, this 
unifying trend has made its way in the digital field.16
The development of  the technical information society and the advances in the 
digital economy have accelerated the need to develop a system capable of  ensuring 
the effectiveness of  the fundamental right to protection in the current circumstances 
and in the context of  the technological/digital development in which we live, 
of  personal data in (progressing) uniform terms by means of  a Regulation. The 
Internal Market increasingly requires the circulation of  data; and the increasingly 
sophisticated processing of  such data urgently requires a standardized system for 
monitoring technical and digital behaviour in order to prevent abuse.
The GDPR is at the heart of  a real reform of  the regime for the protection 
of  personal data, reflecting the (now added) concerns of  the need to reconcile the 
necessary competitiveness and flexibility of  European businesses with effective 
protection of  fundamental rights. A conciliation that is difficult and necessarily 
dependent on casuistic circumstances – an equation that seeks to optimize a culture 
of  citizenship rights (by reserving privacy and proficiency of  each one’s data), 
without impeding the growing deployment of  the digital economy. To some extent, 
a real revolution, with a view to placing Europe at the forefront of  technological 
development, economic growth and competitiveness provided by the wave of  the 
digital economy - but at the same time, with the strong certainty that the European 
citizen, their dignity, and their fundamental rights are Europe’s and integration’s 
“watermark”.
III. Learning algorithms as market intermediaries: the issue 
of  unlimited choice
In a study dedicated to explaining why data (including personal data) is at the 
basis of  the Machine-Learning Revolution – and to what extent artificial intelligence 
is reconfiguring science, business, and politics –, Portuguese scientist Pedro 
Domingos17, Professor in the Department of  Computer Science and Engineering 
at the University of  Washington, explains that the problem that defines the digital 
age is the following: how do we find each other? This applies to both producers and 
consumers – who need to establish a connection before any transaction happens –, 
but also to anyone looking for a job or a romantic partner. Computers allowed the 
existence of  the Internet – and the Internet created a flood of  data and the problem 
of  limitless choice. Now, machine learning uses this infinity of  data to help solve 
the limitless choice problem. Netflix may have 100,000 DVD titles in stock, but 
if  customers cannot find the ones they like, they will end up choosing the hits; so, 
Netflix uses a learning algorithm that identifies customer tastes and recommends 
DVDs. Simple as that, explains the Author.
Computer engineers explain that machine learning is a technology that builds 
itself. What differs machine learning from normal programming is that in the latter, it 
16 General Report - XXVIII FIDE Congress - Vol. I (The internal market and the digital economy)...
17 Pedro Domingos, A revolução do algoritmo mestre. Como a aprendizagem automática está a mudar o mundo 
(Lisboa: Letras & Diálogos, 2017).
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is necessary to explain to the computer what it has to do – step by step. If  I want the 
computer to play chess or make a medical diagnosis I must explain to it how to play 
chess or how to make a diagnosis. But a learning algorithm can learn from the data it 
is given: if  it is given a video of  a car to be driven, of  a road, and of  what a person 
does at the wheel, the learning algorithm learns how to drive. Computers learn by 
simulating reasoning by analogy.18 No wonder, then, that machine learning – this 
method of  transforming data into knowledge – is revolutionizing science, business, 
and politics. With the development of  e-commerce, automated customization has 
become mandatory. That is why the success or failure of  a business – and ultimately 
an entire market or economy – increasingly depends on the quality of  its learning 
algorithms. And these, in turn, depend on our data: the more data they have, the 
more they learn.
As learning algorithms become market intermediaries, more power is 
concentrated in them.19 Hence, Google’s algorithms determine what information 
is found, Amazons’s algorithms determine what products to buy, Match.com’s 
algorithms suggest the ideal match for those looking for it. The decisive step in 
choosing remains ours, but 99% of  the selection is done by algorithms – explains 
Pedro Domingos. A new type of  network effect emerges: whoever has the more 
customers – accumulates more data – obtains the best algorithmic models – and 
wins the most new customers…20 Therefore, a virtuous circle (or a vicious circle, in 
the perspective of  competition, for how to deal with digital monopoly).
In any case, machine learning is just a technology – and therefore what matters 
is what we decide to do with it and how to regulate its use. What data should we give 
to the computer so that it can achieve the model we want and that serves us? With 
whom should we share our data? More than a billion users have decided to share 
their personal data with Facebook – and Facebook’s main use of  the knowledge 
generated by such data is the targeting of  ads. In return, the company provides the 
infrastructure for sharing – that is the bargain of  using Facebook. As Facebook’s 
learning algorithms learn more and better from users’ data, the company gains 
more value from it. There are no free services on the Internet ... we are always 
paying in some way. Google knows about our searches, Amazon knows our literary 
preferences, Apple knows about the songs we download. These companies collect 
and sell information about us.21 
There is no problem in marketing our data as long as it is done in a free and 
clear way. It is very easy to communicate with WhatsApp or Skype, especially for 
professional reasons, and it is difficult for us to relinquish such services. The problem 
is that some companies use our data for what is not of  our interest - and until 
the GDPR was implemented, we had no way to stop it. However, most people are 
unaware of  the amount of  data they collect on their daily lives - and the potential 
costs and benefits involved. In the meantime, big companies act without transparency.
All this is part of  a business model through which Internet users pay with 
their personal data for a service - with no (seemingly) damaging consequences until 
the Russians came to use fake news as a military strategy. In the case of  a business, 
the solution would be simple: if  Facebook and its counterparts exercise a digital 
monopoly on which there is no taxation, it is important to focus European taxation 
on digital platforms of  this nature, by paying taxes for the targeted advertising 
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business. Moreover, to hold companies accountable for the irregularities committed 
from the scope of  the business they offer to those in the European Union. The 
GDPR imposes fines of  up to EUR 20 000 000 or up to 4% of  the company’s annual 
turnover (whichever is higher) in case of  breach of  its provisions [Article 83 (5)]. 
However, it is important to know how the European and national authorities will 
now use the new tools that the GDPR gives them.
It is, therefore, urgent to discuss such questions without reservations. It is 
important to make people aware of  what they want to share (and how and where) 
and what they do not want to share because learning algorithms increasingly decide 
who gets credit, who buys what, who gets what job, who gets what increase, what 
actions go up and down, how much insurance costs, where the police officers are, 
who has romantic encounters and with whom, etc. ...22
For this reason, the Portuguese MEP João Ferreira recently questioned 
the European Commission about the measures to be taken to face the so-called 
“algorithmic discrimination” (based on sex, age, ethnic origin, sexual orientation, 
etc.) caused by risk management algorithms. In other words, what measures are 
being considered to extend existing provisions for certain sectors (e.g. granting of  
bank credit), ensuring a more global scope? The GDPR extends the right to object 
(Article 21) and non-subjection to individual automated decisions (Article 22), 
including definition of  profiles. That is, the holder has the right not to be subject to 
any decision taken solely based on the automated processing of  his data (objecting 
to profiling, in order to assess and typify individuals on the basis of  their data) or 
significantly affect it. This is because there must be i) human intervention on the part 
of  the controller, and ii) a contradictory statement to expose the owner’s arguments 
and challenge the decision.
But perhaps, the question is even deeper: how do we prevent learning 
algorithms from perpetuating the discrimination underlying the data from which 
they learn and develop? The scandal involving Facebook and Cambridge Analytica 
(a private company for data analysis and strategic communication) raises, among 
others, the problem of  regulating learning algorithms. The problem lies, above all, 
in the fact that there is no necessary connection between intelligence and free will. 
Unlike human beings, algorithms do not have a will of  their own, they serve the 
goals that are set for them.23 Though spectacular, artificial intelligence bears little 
resemblance to the mental processes of  humans – as the Portuguese neuroscientist 
António Damásio, Professor at the University of  Southern California, brilliantly 
explains.24 To this extent, not all impacts of  artificial intelligence are easily regulated 
or translated into legislation25  – and so traditional regulation might not work. 
The example of  fake news is elucidating. Facebook’s algorithms aim to maximize 
the users’ involvement – they intend for people to read fake news because that is how 
they can show them more ads. It does not matter to the algorithm whether the news 
is true or false, good or bad. Moreover, since fake news is the most scandalous, it 
tends to be the one that attracts the attention of  Internet users. Ultimately, learning 
algorithms are stupid – as Pedro Domingos explains – because they lack, at least for 
22 Ibidem.
23 Ibidem.
24 António Damásio, A estranha ordem das coisas – a vida, os sentimentos e as culturas humanas...
25 On this matter, see European Parliament, Scientific Foresight study “Ethical Aspects of  Cyber-Physical 
Systems”, Science and Technology Options Assessment Panel (STOA), 2016, available on http://www.
europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_STU(2016)563501.
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now, common sense and ethics, which are human characteristics, as well as empathy 
and creativity.26
In a recent study, the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights sought 
to explain how algorithmic discrimination may occur, suggesting possible solutions 
to move towards fundamental rights compliance in this field. The study gives an 
account of  the following examples: i) checking the quality of  data as it remains a 
challenge to assess the quality of  all data collected and used for building algorithms 
given the amount of  data generated and used; ii) promoting transparency, opening 
up for scrutiny how algorithms were built, allowing others to detect, and where 
necessary rectify, any erroneous applications; iii) conducting fundamental rights 
impact assessments (including the assessment of  the potential for discrimination 
in relation to different grounds) in order to identify potential biases and abuses in 
the application of  and output from algorithms; and iv) making sure that the way the 
algorithm was built and operates may be meaningfully explained – most notably, which 
data was used to create the algorithm.27  
Therefore, the GDPR does not allow lawyers to rest with the digital and 
technological revolution. The complex systems of  artificial intelligence that are being 
forged are not just machines, they learn to recognize patterns and to adopt strategies 
that are beyond human comprehension. In addition, it may be humans themselves 
to give them control voluntarily, because they have great facility to take orders and 
be dazzled by what they do not know.28 Here, the lessons of  the young philosopher 
Étienne de la Boétie on the subject of  voluntary servitude are relevant.29 The lessons 
of  the young philosopher about voluntary servitude and the reasons for which we 
abdicate our ability to decide are still valid here - something not only explained by 
the use of  force. To capture this “something more” that explains the domination, 
Étienne de la Boétie already concluded, in the middle of  the 16th century, that those 
who give up freedom gain bondage - which, moreover, can be a more comfortable 
place than freedom. What supports this delivery, according to Étienne de la Boétie? 
The fear of  freedom - explains the Brazilian historian Leandro Karnal.30 For, as we 
well know, it is easier and more convenient to be a subject than to be a citizen. 
It was for no other reason that the European Parliament called on the European 
Commission, on the basis of  Article 114 TFEU, to present a legislative proposal on 
legal issues related to the development and use of  robotics and predictable artificial 
intelligence for the next 10 to 15 years - a proposal that contemplates the hypothesis 
of  recognition of  electronic people, in addition to the usual natural and legal 
persons.31 In other words, to create a specific legal status for robots, so that at least 
the most sophisticated autonomous robots will have the status of  electronic people 
responsible for remedying any damages they may cause – and eventually apply the 
electronic personality to cases in which that robots make autonomous decisions or 
interact in any way with third parties independently. At the request of  the European 
Parliament, the European Commission adopted the Communication “Artificial 
26 Pedro Domingos, A revolução do algoritmo mestre...  
27 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), #BigData: discrimination in data-supported 
decision making, available on http://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2018/big-data-discrimination.
28 Pedro Domingos, A revolução do algoritmo mestre...
29 Étienne de la Boétie, Discurso da servidão voluntária (São Paulo: Editora Brasiliense, 1982).
30 Leandro Karnal, O medo à liberdade e a servidão voluntária (Café Filosófico), available on https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=zR8QzE_goCs.
31 Resolution of  the European Parliament with recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law 
Rules on Robotics...
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Intelligence for Europe” in April 2018 – and foresees by the end of  this year the adoption 
of  a coordinated plan in that domain, under the principle that “new technologies are 
based on values”.32 Herein lies the idea that the development of  robotics, artificial 
intelligence, and digitization (in a broad sense) requires that all those involved in the 
development and commercialization of  such applications assume legal responsibility 
for the quality of  the technology they produce at all stages of  the process. That is, 
sustainable technologies – or a fairly secure, equitable, open digital environment.
IV. Data processing and decision making: the issue of  
democracy
Some time ago, the most vigilant jus-publicists realized that power was de-
territorialised. As Gustavo Zagrabelsky explains, political and constitutional power 
is no longer exercised in the same way, because power does not have a territorial 
framework (or only partially), configuring what has been called “de-territorisation of  
power”. Faced with this process, there is a growing gap between the free expression 
of  political preferences and the real capacity of  this expression to have repercussions 
on the decision-making processes that affect the daily life of  voters. The right to vote 
expressed in a given electoral district ceases to be effective because the representatives 
elected in this way have no influence over the decisions that have been made in 
such circumscription.33 In this context, governments change but policies do not. The 
margin for change is greatly reduced because the structures of  the State are aging, 
thought of  for another time, and unable to manage transnational dynamics they do 
not control.34
This mismatch translates into an unprecedented divorce between power and 
politics, as Zygmunt Bauman explained: power understood here as the ability to 
carry things out and politics perceived as the ability to decide what things should be 
carried out. This produces the effect of  a national political system reduced to the 
management of  routine administration and a system of  global power without political 
representation and without any control. Finances, investment capital, the circulation 
of  goods and capital, the labour market, etc., are beyond the responsibility and 
reach of  the only political agencies still available to fulfil the task of  regulation and 
supervision - the States. The European Union was the only more or less successful 
(because incomplete) attempt to regulate global flows and mitigate their effects. 
Thus, under conditions of  global and digital interdependence, more important than 
the answer to the question “What to do?” would be the answer to the question: 
“Who is going to do it?”35
And here we go back to the data. Among the controversial statements of  
Yuval Harari in Homo Deus, one stands: as data-processing conditions change in the 
21st century, democracy might decline or disappear.36 Trying to decipher where power 
went in the digital age, the Author explains that as both the volume and speed of  
32 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee 
of  the Regions “Artificial Intelligence for Europe”, Brussels, 25 April 2018, COM(2018) 237 final, 
p. 4, available on https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/communication-artificial-
intelligence-europe.
33 Paulo Castro Rangel, O estado do Estado. Ensaios de política constitucional sobre justiça e democracia (Alfragide: 
Dom Quixote, 2009).
34 Gustavo Zagrebelsky, Il diritto mite (Torino: Einaudi, 1992).
35 Zygmunt Bauman and Carlo Bordoni, Estado de crise (Lisboa: Relógio D’Água Editores, 2016).
36 Yuval Noah Harari, Homo Deus: história breve do amanhã (Amadora: Elsinore, 2017).
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data increase, respectable institutions such as the electoral system, political parties and 
Parliaments might become obsolete because they are unable to process data with the 
necessary efficiency. These institutions evolved in a time when politics was advancing 
faster than technology and were able to regulate and control its course. According to 
Harari, democracy and free market gained the upper hand because, under the unique 
conditions of  the late 20th century, they were able to improve the global data-processing 
system through distributed processing methods rather than centralised processing 
methods. However, in the 21st century, traditional political structures cannot process 
data fast enough to produce meaningful visions of  the future.
Hence, voters sense that democratic mechanisms no longer empower them – 
power is shifting away from them and they don’t know where it has gone. In the UK, 
voters sense that power has shifted to the EU and they vote for Brexit. In the US, 
voters sense that power is monopolised by the “system” and they vote for Trump. 
They are mistaken in both cases, Harari explains, because power will not return to 
ordinary voters. But this does not entail the return to dictatorships identical to those of  
the 20th century, as authoritarian regimes are equally overwhelmed with the speed and 
volume of  dataflow. Democracies and dictatorships are similarly overpowered and the 
“art of  governing” has become the mere management of  current affairs.
As power gaps do not last long, it is important to know who will build and 
control the new (political?) structures that will replace the traditional ones.37 Perhaps 
a new, more efficient, omniscient, and omnipotent data-processing system, a kind of  
Internet-of-All-Things?38 It’s true that Google is quicker to detect an epidemic than 
traditional health organizations, but only if  we allow its full access to the information 
we generate. Free-flowing data can also reduce pollution and waste by rationalising 
transport systems. It may allow for an intelligent car-sharing system, controlled by 
learning algorithms, that would always know where we are and where we want to go 
according to our daily habits.39 Provided, however, we increasingly give up our privacy, 
autonomy, individuality.
But what harm or risk is there in this? – would ask our European citizen, still 
getting used to the GDPR, like a newly awakened princess. If  not properly regulated, 
this civilizing choice entails the loss of  what is most genuine in mankind, as human 
experiences would be reduced to data patterns. We believed that the experiences took 
place within us and that was where we sought the reason for everything that happened 
to us. But, when we connect our experience with the great dataflow and let algorithms 
discover the meaning of  what is happening to us40, we cease to make free choices 
based on rational judgments and lose human dignity. “Value” no longer lies in everyday 
experiences, but in turning these experiences into free-flowing data.
And that is why, increasingly, the intimate discourse exposed on the Internet as 
a shared political fact no longer needs to correspond to the truth to succeed, if  it is 
accepted as close, possible, credible - that is, something that could happen - me or 
my neighbour. What results in the Internet is shared space, the projection of  close, 
intimate perception and here, it is not so much what is said, but what people hear41. 
Some of  the disinformation that runs on the Internet - the most sophisticated and 
fraudulent - has the power to shape the way people see the world because it meets what 




41 On that point, see Yanko Moyano Diaz, “Understanding political beliefs: advantages and conditions 
of  a culturalist notion of  event”, UNIO – EU Law Journal, vol. 4, nº. 1 (2018).
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they want to hear, legitimizing their prejudices. The mechanism for reporting false 
news (on Facebook, for example) is not enough to change the user’ perception.42 That 
is why it has become increasingly difficult in the digital age to convince citizens that 
they are wrong.43 If  social media outlets are today the gateway to content, should they 
not be subject to the same editorial rules and certification of  regulated media contents 
in order to combat disinformation?44
Overall, what is the use of  democratic elections if  learning algorithms anticipate 
who we will vote on?45 The scandal involving Facebook and Cambridge Analytica 
reveals the extent to which it is possible, in democracy, to promote manipulation of  
the electorate by reliance on illegitimately obtained data (87 million Internet users had 
their data negotiated, unaware of  the use of  electoral manipulation). As we know, from 
the collection of  information of  300,000 Internet users (through an inquiry/game), 
Facebook allowed the misappropriation of  personal data of  millions of  people. In 
the United Kingdom, as far as we know, 1.1 million citizens have been targeted. If  the 
difference between Remain and Exit was 1.3 million votes, it is legitimate to assume 
that the manipulation carried out may have been decisive in the results of  the British 
referendum.
It is not a given, therefore, that a technological revolution leads to the effective 
empowerment of  citizens and the perfection of  democratic institutions. Citizens can 
be increasingly marginalized or manipulated in decision-making processes. This is not 
to weaken efforts to develop a digital democracy46 – whose concept implies the use of  
electronic means of  communication to empower and broaden the action of  citizens 
and (tendentially) control of  government and public institutions47. The problem is that 
this demands a change in civic culture - and this is the most difficult to change in 
politics. Hence, it is said that digital democracy is a cultural change. Digital began as 
a revolution for industry 4.0 - and then for commerce, tourism, etc. – but will it be 
for politics as well? Here, the time lag does not help, since digital causes expectations 
for the immediate, and citizens do not perceive the slow (proceduralised) response of  
democratic institutions to the rule of  law, which leads to growing discontent.48 
In theory, through the Internet, it seems possible to create a global public sphere 
that allows political dialogue between citizens and their concerns beyond artificial 
boundaries. The question is how to optimize the potential of  the Internet to ensure 
democratic legitimacy based on the value of  the rule of  law49 – this is the great challenge 
facing the Western legal-political culture in defence of  its most recognized and precious 
heritage. The rule of  law resumes today in a global scenario (marked by fragmentation, 
financialization, digitisation) that is not properly favourable to it. Positioning for the 
42 Dora Santos Silva et al (coord.), Enquadramento dos temas para a conferência Democracia 4.0 – O 
futuro da democracia na era digital, Session IV: A vertigem da desinformação, Representação da Comissão 
Europeia em Portugal, Reitoria da Universidade Nova de Lisboa, 8 May 2018.
43 Yanko Moyano Diaz, Understanding political beliefs…
44 Dora Santos Silva et al. (coord.), Enquadramento dos temas para a conferência Democracia 4.0 – O futuro da 
democracia na era digital...
45 Yuval Noah Harari, Homo Deus: história breve do amanhã...
46 See Corien Prins et al. (ed.), Digital democracy in a globalized world... 
47 Marco Lisi (coord.), Enquadramento dos temas para a conferência Democracia 4.0 – O futuro da democracia 
na era digital, Session II: A nova vaga da democracia digital, Representação da Comissão Europeia em 
Portugal, Reitoria da Universidade Nova de Lisboa, 8 May 2018.
48 This idea was proposed by His Excellency the President of  the Portuguese Republic, Marcelo 
Rebelo de Sousa, during the closing session of  the conference Democracia 4.0 – O futuro da democracia 
na era digital...
49 Ingolf  Pernice, “E-democracy, the global citizen and multilevel constitutionalism”, Digital democracy 
in a globalized world...
® UNIO - EU LAW JOURNAL Vol. 4, No. 2, July 2018
Alessandra Silveira & Pedro Froufe15
rule of  law means that political institutions - or that power, wherever they now reside 
– strictly aim to guarantee the fundamental rights of  individuals.50
In the ideal world, digital democracy could implement techniques to increase 
the transparency of  political processes, encourage direct involvement and citizen 
participation, as well as improve the quality of  information and opinions, by opening 
new spaces for communication and deliberation. In this sense, the digital revolution 
could transform democratic representation by changing the spaces and times of  
political action.51 Digital tools could enable other ways of  involving citizens in the life of  
their street, city, or country. However, the extent to which public entities are genuinely 
interested in increasing and improving the level of  civic participation and whether 
citizens are genuinely interested in actively participating in democratic decision-making 
processes that affect their daily lives, remains to be seen.52
Digital can effectively revolutionize democracy, but it will no longer be the 
“physical” democracy we know. We cannot anticipate whether it will be better or 
worse, just different. This implies a civilizational option for the wide availability of  
data – which again confronts us with the regulatory challenge. At the “Democracy 
4.0” conference organised in Lisbon by the European Commission Representation 
in Portugal, European Commissioner Carlos Moedas (responsible for Research, 
Science, and Innovation) showed great enthusiasm for blockchain technology applied 
to democracy because it would prevent intermediation (State, banking, etc.) and avoid 
upstream inequality by spreading recognition. If  a dictator wanted to nationalize 
land in a given country, as exemplified by the Commissioner, he/she would have to 
erase property registration on millions of  computers that recognized it - which would 
be impossible. At a particularly difficult time in European integration, permanently 
provoked by nationalist and xenophobic populism and its manifestations of  collective 
bestiality, it may not be a bad idea ...
 
V. Protection of  personal data and universality: the jus-
fundamental identity issue
Since May 25, 2018, the GDPR has been the subject of  much criticism - especially 
the one according to which the consent we are granting would be fallacious, since it only 
deceives internet users in the sense that they would be more protected. The complexity 
of  the GDPR and its applicability to non-European companies operating in the Union, 
especially US companies, is also criticized. Posts claiming that few companies would be 
fully complying with it, including about 60% of  technology companies, circulate online. 
That is, no one would still be ready for the GDPR. It is anticipated that regulators 
would initially be more lenient towards business as long as they do not gauge how 
GDPR really works.53
Firstly, it should be remembered (that is the purpose of  this text) that the 
GDPR fulfils the essential dimensions of  a fundamental right laid down in Article 
8 CFREU which applies universally to those within the Union. Only from this 
50 Danilo Zolo, “Teoria e crítica do Estado de direito”, in O Estado de direito – história, teoria, crítica, 
coord. Pietro Costa and Danilo Zolo (São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2006). 
51 Marco Lisi, Enquadramento dos temas para a conferência Democracia 4.0 – O futuro da democracia na era digital...
52 Ana Neves et al (coords.), Enquadramento dos temas para a conferência Democracia 4.0 – O futuro 
da democracia na era digital, Session III: Democracia participativa – criar pontes, defender interesses 
e protestar, Representação da Comissão Europeia em Portugal, Reitoria da Universidade Nova de 
Lisboa, 8 May 2018.
53 Sarah Jeong, No one’s ready for GDPR, in The Verge, 22 May 2018, https://www.theverge.
com/2018/5/22/17378688/gdpr-general-data-protection-regulation-eu. 
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fundamental point of  view can the GDPR be fully understood: “Everyone has the 
right to the protection of  personal data concerning him / her” (highlighted). This means all 
persons who are in the territory of  the Union (and not only the residents) are holders 
of  that fundamental right by virtue of  the principle of  universality. In good time, 
the European legislator has “corrected the navigation” by amending the wording 
of  the GDPR in this sense.54 Thus, there is no denying that the GDPR strengthens 
and broadens the rights of  personal data holders - and it does so from conception 
(proactive approach to ensure protection throughout the development process of  a 
new product) and by (ensuring that only the necessary amount of  personal data will 
be collected, used and maintained) introducing new transparency requirements.  
The territorial scope of  the GDPR is primarily related to the location of  the 
data controller or subcontractor’s establishment - if  it is in the Union, the treatment 
is subject to the GDPR regardless of  whether the processing takes place within or 
outside the Union The establishment presupposes the effective exercise of  an activity 
based on a stable installation, and the legal form of  such establishment is not relevant 
for that purpose (branch, office, etc.). But even if  the establishment is located outside 
the Union, the GDPR will apply whenever the data subject is in the Union and the 
treatment is related to i) the supply of  goods and services to the owner or; ii) the 
control of  his/her behaviour.55  In addition, the GDPR applies to the processing of  
personal data by an official established not in the Union, but in a place where the law 
of  a Member State applies under public international law [Article 3(3)]. 
This must be the case because the Internet knows no territorial boundaries - 
and data protection only results if  it is carried out in a universal way. It may seem 
exaggerated - but this is the Europe we want. As Angela Merkel would have said in 
her official greetings to the then President elected Donald Trump, we have here some 
principles that we like to respect. No one is obliged to offer goods and services to 
data subjects in the European Union - but if  they intend to do so, benefiting from 
the European market, they have to adapt to their standards. This allows for a level 
playing field for all companies operating in the European market. The GDPR requires 
companies based outside the Union to apply the same rules as companies based in 
the Union if  they offer goods and services related to personal data or monitor the 
behaviour of  individuals within the Union.56 This occurs when they are followed on 
the Internet for the potential use of  profiling techniques, tending to make decisions 
about them or analysing/predicting their preferences and attitudes.
The GDPR, therefore, does not introduce an illusion. Silence and inactivity cease 
to be considered valid consents, and clear affirmative action is required to express 
consent to data processing. As we live in democratic societies, it is incumbent upon the 
data subject to attribute to that consent the relevance (or, on the contrary, lightness) 
that he/she deems compatible with the exercise of  their fundamental rights. In any 
case, it cannot be denied that the GDPR establishes a comprehensive set of  rules 
on personal data breaches. It also introduces an obligation to notify the supervisory 
54 Corrigendum to Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  27 
April 2016 on the protection of  natural persons with regard to the processing of  personal data and 
on the free movement of  such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection 
Regulation), published in the Official Journal of  the European Union, L 127/2, 23 May 2018.
55 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council 
“Stronger protection, new opportunities - Commission guidance on the direct application 
of  the General Data Protection Regulation as of  25 May 2018” [COM(2018) 43 final], 
Brussels, 24 Jan.2018, available on https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/
HTML/?uri=CELEX%3A52018DC0043&qid=1517578296944&from=EN.
56 Ibidem.
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authority, within 72 hours at the latest, of  where the breach of  data is liable to entail 
a risk to individual rights and freedoms by requiring the holder of  the data to be 
informed about of  the violation. This greatly enhances protection compared to the 
previous regime, since only electronic communications service providers, essential 
service operators and digital service providers were obliged to report data breaches 
under the existing Directives.57/58 
Of  course, much remains to be done by public authorities - national and European. 
The Portuguese State, for example, has not yet acted to produce legislation to make 
the GDPR enforceable. Although the Regulation enjoys direct applicability, without 
the action of  the national legislature, it is impaired, for example, the application of  
fines set forth in Article 83(5) GDPR, under penalty of  violation of  the sanctioning 
legality is well-nigh impossible without incorporation into the national laws of  Member 
States. In addition, the GDPR provides for limitations on its application, with a view to 
ensuring judicial independence and judicial proceedings, as well as the enforcement of  
civil actions - and here, Member States enjoy some discretion in legislative action that 
should not be delayed. But the process has had some amateur outrages – moreover, 
already identified by an overwhelming opinion from the National Data Protection 
Commission on the legislative proposal. 
In any case, as long as the Privacy Regulation for electronic communications does 
not enter into force, the effectiveness of  the GDPR is, to some extent, undermined. 
In the opinion of  the European Data Protection Supervisor on the proposal for an 
e-privacy Regulation, the European legislator is called upon to address the issue of  
the processing of  electronic communications data by controllers other than providers 
of  electronic communications services. The additional protections offered to the 
communications data would be unsuccessful if  they could be easily circumvented by, 
for example, the transfer of  data to third parties. It should also be ensured that the rules 
on privacy and electronic communications do not allow for a level of  protection lower 
than that established in the GDPR. In this sense, consent must be genuine, offering 
free choice to users, in compliance with the GDPR. In addition, the new rules must 
also define solid requirements for privacy from design to default - as GDPR does.59
In view of  the foregoing, we can conclude that the GDPR concretises the solution 
adopted by the CFREU when it empowered the right to protection of  personal data 
(Article 8) regarding the right to privacy protection (Article 7). For European Union 
law, not all personal data is likely, by its nature, to hinder the privacy of  the data subject 
– but it must also be protected. That is, not all data is of  the same nature - and this 
justifies the autonomy conferred on the protection of  personal data in relation to the 
protection of  privacy in the Union’s order. In this area, the CFREU goes a step further 
in relation to several Member States and in relation to the European Convention on 
Human Rights, in so far as it enshrines a fundamental right protecting data that do not 
have to be private/intimate. It is sufficient that they are personal. It is a civilizational 
advance that the GDPR now densifies - and that, by the impact of  its territorial 
application, benefits (potentially) the rest of  the world.
57 Directive 2002/58/EC of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  12 July 2002 concerning 
the processing of  personal data and the protection of  privacy in the electronic communications sector 
(Directive on privacy and electronic communications).
58 Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  6 July 2016 concerning 
measures for a high common level of  security of  network and information systems across the Union.
59 Opinion of  the European Data Protection Supervisor on the Proposal for a Regulation on Privacy and Electronic 
Communications (ePrivacy Regulation)…
